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INTRODUCTION
Richard B. Lillich*
For twenty years after the adoption in 1948 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,' progress in the area of the international protection of human rights was confined almost exclusively
to clarifying and codifying the substantive law norms: nearly two
dozen covenants and conventions, for instance, were promulgated
during this period under the auspices of the United Nations alone.
Comparatively little progress, on the other hand, was made toward
creating effective procedural machinery to protect the rights of
individuals throughout the world. After 1968, which was celebrated
as International Year for Human Rights, a much-needed evaluation
of the entire human rights area, substantive and procedural, began.
In a landmark article, Professor Richard B. Bilder, long a supporter
of the human rights movement, raised a series of hard questions
about the efficacy of the international approach.2 At the same time
Mr. John Carey, in a provocative monograph, surveyed in nuts and
bolts fashion various existing and proposed UN implementation
techniques.3 The eight articles in the present Symposium, much to
the credit of the Board of Editors of the Santa Clara Lawyer, represent yet another valuable contribution to the continuing reassessment of where we stand and where we should go in this most
important area of international law.
For the lawyer and the concerned citizen in the United States,
the Symposium brings home the necessity for action on three fronts.
First, the United States, long a vocal advocate of the international
protection of human rights, must start to practice what it has been
preaching. Its timid approach to the ratification of human rights
conventions-of the three minor conventions President Kennedy
transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent in 1963, only
the Supplementary Convention on Slavery4 received the consent
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law, and Director, Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute. A.B. 1954, Oberlin College; LL.B.
with Specialization in International Affairs, 1957, Cornell University, LL.M. (in
International Law) 1959, New York University; J.S.D. 1960, New York University.
Member, New York Bar.
1 G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).

2 See Bilder, Rethinking International Human Rights: Some Basic Questions,
1969 Wis. L. REV. 171.
3 See J. CAREY, UN PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1970) [hereinafter cited as J. CAREY].
4 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, [1967] 18 U.S.T. 3201,
T.I.A.S. No. 6418 (effective Dec. 6, 1967).
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of the Senate and subsequently was ratified-must give way to a
vigorous policy aimed at the prompt approval of as many of these
conventions as possible. The spurious constitutional arguments
against ratification, based upon the mistaken belief, reiterated by
Professor Raymond in his contribution to this Symposium, that
"human rights are matters that concern the relations between a
government and its subjects, or between the people themselves,
and that they can only be dealt with by internal action of the
country concerned," 5 have long been discredited.8 Mr. Bitker captures the present writer's astonishment at their invocation today in
his first sentence: "It is unbelievable in light of American history
that anyone could question the right of the United States to enter
into international agreements to protect human rights."7 He rightly
notes that "[i]n the national interest as well as in the interest of
men everywhere, the United States should act promptly in ratifying
those human rights treaties which it has supported in the United
'8
Nations and its affiliated agencies."
Secondly, the United States, assisted by lawyers, concerned
citizens, and private organizations, must make a greater effort to
survey recent and contemplated human rights conventions, and to
identify other areas where the international approach to the pro5 Raymond, Genocide: An Unconstitutional Human Rights Convention? 12
SANTA CLARA LAW. 294, 306 (1972). Recent events in Bangladesh, in the opinion
of most observers, have demonstrated beyond a doubt that "genocide is a matter of
international concern and is, therefore, an appropriate subject for the exercise of the
treaty-making power. In our shrinking world the massive destruction of a racial,
religious or national group in one country has its impact on members of this group
in other countries, stimulates demands for intervention and inevitably troubles international relations." Goldberg & Gardner, Time to Act on the Genocide Convention,
58 A.B.A.J. 141, 142 (1972). Last year the Foreign Relations Committee, accepting
this reasoning, recommended that "the Senate give its advice and comment to ratification of the Genocide Convention by an overwhelming vote." S. EXEC. REP. No.
92-6, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1971). Its Chairman, Senator Fulbright, correctly
prophesized "that action by the full Senate might be delayed pending the drafting of
legislation to carry out the treaty within the United States." N.Y. Times, March 31,
1971, at 11, col. 1.
6 See e.g., McDougal & Arens, The Genocide Convention and the Constitution,
3 VA". L. REV. 683 (1950). More recently, Professor Henkin has demonstrated
conclusively that "the argument that the United States is without power under the
Constitution to adhere to such treaties has no basis whatever-in the language of
the Constitution, in its travaux priparatoires, in the institutions it established, in
its principles of federalism or of separation of powers, in almost two centuries of
constitutional history, or in any other consideration relevant to constitutional interpretation." Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights,
116 U. PA. L. REV. 1012, 1014-15 (1968). See also MacChesney, Should the United
States Ratify the Covenants? A Question of Merits, Not of Constitutional Law, 62
Am. J. INT'L L. 912 (1968).
7 Bitker, The Constitutionality of International Agreements on Human
Rights,
12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 279 (1972).
S Id. at 292. These remarks equally apply to those treaties, such as the American
Convention on Human Rights, not drafted under United Nations auspices. See text
accompanying notes 9 and 10, infra.
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tection of human rights might be most useful. The article in this
Symposium by the Professors Thomas on the American Convention
on Human Rights9 is an excellent example of the needed scholarly
critique of one recent convention.'0 Professor Claydon's pioneer
article on the Draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,"
which has received scant attention in a United Nations preoccupied
2
by the racial issue, is another fine example.' Both substantively
and procedurally, it seems, this draft convention has suffered from
3
"double standard" treatment by Third World countries.' Finally,
Professor Bond's article, suggesting that the laws of war, one of
the areas where the international community first exhibited an
interest in protecting the rights of individuals, should be made applicable to all armed conflicts, whether international or internal,
contains a host of valuable comments about ways to improve the
substance and the implementation of the laws of war. As he observes
need now is
about various pending draft documents, "[t]he urgent
14
proposals.'
various
these
integrate
and
to analyze
Thirdly, and just as important, attention must be focused upon
the measures and procedures which the international community
must adopt if it truly wishes to guarantee the effective application
of substantive human rights norms. Professors Nanda and Bassiouni, in their article on slavery, point out that "due to the
clandestine nature of the slave trade at present, effective measures,
which are world-wide and internationally coordinated, are necessary
5
to destroy the remaining vestiges of the institution."' Mr. Harris,
in his perceptive comments about the Nuremberg Judgment, concludes with a plea "to create an international court of criminal
justice as an independent body or as a division of the International
9 O.A.S. Official Records, OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65, rev. 1, corr. 1 (English
1970). The text may be found in 65 Am. J. INT'IL L. 679 (1971).
10 Thomas & Thomas, Human Rights and the Organization of American States,
12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 319 (1972). For a considerably more pessimistic view of this
convention, see Buergenthal, The American Convention on Human Rights: Illusions
and Hopes, 21 BuFFALo L. REv. 121 (1971).
11 ECOSOC Res. 1233, 42 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1., at 13, U.N. Doc. E/4393
(1967).
12 Claydon, The Treaty Protection of Religious Rights: U.N. Draft Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion of Belief, 12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 403 (1972).
13 Id. at 421. For other examples of this "double standard," see J. CARFY, supra
note 3, at 143-53. See also text accompanying note 18, infra.
14 Bond, Proposed Revisions in the Law of War Applicable to Internal Conflict,
12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 223, 225 (1972).
15 Nanda & Bassiouni, Slavery and Slave Trade: Steps Toward Eradication, 12
SANTA CLARA LAW. 424, 441 (1972). However, one may question their conclusion that
insofar as implementation is concerned the international community "must place the
highest priority on those programs which lead to attitudinal changes rather than
coercive-repressive measures." Id. at 442.
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Court of Justice with jurisdiction over individuals for crimes committed by them in international law.""6 Mr. Greenspan's article,
however, warns us that even when procedures exist they must be
utilized fairly if respect for the international approach to the protection of human rights is to be maintained, much less developed. 7
His study of the various bodies set up to investigate complaints of
infringement of human rights by Israel in the so-called "occupied
territories" shows the extent to which the United Nations once
again has applied a "double standard" against Israel, obviously for
political reasons.' 8
This Symposium, challenging as it is, by no means exhausts
the range of problems now current in the human rights field.
Omitted, for instance, is any consideration of the new United Nations rules governing the right of individual petition,"9 surely the
most significant procedural breakthrough of the past quarter century. As Mr. Carey recently remarked, "[t]heir adoption is a milestone in the evolution of U.N. practice on human rights protection."2 0
Such an omission, however, merely underscores the numerous issues
which still need serious study if the movement to protect human
rights internationally is to continue apace. By bringing pressure
upon the United States to ratify existing human rights conventions,
by surveying contemplated human rights conventions and identifying new areas where international agreement on the protection of
the rights of individuals might be productive, and by suggesting
procedural devices for the effective implementation of substantive
human rights norms, lawyers and concerned citizens in the United
States can contribute greatly to the protection of every man throughout the world.
16 Harris, InternationalHuman Rights and the Nuremberg Judgment, 12 SANTA
CLARA LAW.209, 221 (1972). In view of frequent misconceptions about the extent of
the Nuremberg Judgment, it is worth noting his observation that "[glenocide and
other crimes against humanity are punishable under the Nuremberg decision only
when connected with a war of aggression .... The Nuremberg Judgment does not,
therefore, interdict genocide, or like atrocities, as crimes in international law when
committed independently of war." Id. at -. These remarks underscore the importance of universal acceptance of the Genocide Convention. See text accompanying
note 5,supra.
17 Greenspan, Human Rights in the Territories Occupied by Israel, 12 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 377 (1972).
18 Id. at 378. See Rodley, The United Nations and Human Rights in the Middle

East, 38 SOCIAL RESEARCH 217 (1971). See also note 13 and accompanying text,
supra.
19 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2 (XXIV) CRP. 6 (Aug. 18, 1971).
20 Carey, Progress on Human Rights at the United Nations, 66 Am. J. INT'L L.

107 (1972).

